Abstract. In typical RSA, it is impossible to create a key pair (e, d) such that both are simultaneously much shorter than φ(N ). This is because if d is selected first, then e will be of the same order of magnitude as φ(N ), and vice versa. At Asiacrypt'99, Sun et al. designed three variants of RSA using prime factors p and q of unbalanced size. The first RSA variant is an attempt to make the private exponent d short below N log 2 N + 56. The third RSA variant is constructed by such a method that allows a trade-off between the lengths of d and e. Unfortunately, at Asiacrypt'2000, Durfee and Nguyen broke the illustrated instances of the first RSA variant and the third RSA variant by solving small roots to trivariate modular polynomial equations. Moreover, they showed that the instances generated by these three RSA variants with unbalanced p and q in fact become more insecure than those instances, having the same sizes of exponents as the former, in RSA with balanced p and q. In this paper, we focus on designing a new RSA variant with balanced d and e, and balanced p and q in order to make such an RSA variant more secure. Moreover, we also extend this variant to another RSA variant in which allows a trade-off between the lengths of d and e. Based on our RSA variants, an application to entity authentication for defending the stolen-secret attack is presented.
Introduction
RSA [14] , the most popular public key cryptosystem, was announced in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman at MIT. However, RSA suffers from heavy computation because it requires exponentiation operations modulo a large integer N (N = pq, a product of two large primes). The RSA encryption and decryption time is almost proportional to the number of bits in the exponent. In order to reduce the RSA encryption (signature verification) time or decryption (signature generation) time, it is important to choose a small public exponent or a short private exponent. Generally speaking, in standard RSA, encryption are much faster than decryption because the public exponent is usually selected as 2 16 +1, while the private exponent is of the same order of magnitude as φ(N ). In some applications, one would like to accelerate decryption process. Thus selecting a short private exponent is preferred. In such a case, the encryption will be cost-inefficient because the size of public exponent will be of the same order of magnitude as φ(N ). Towards to the use of RSA with short private exponent, one must be careful with the short exponent attacks on RSA. In 1990, Wiener [21] first showed that the instances of RSA cryptosystem with short secret exponent (d < N 0.25 ) are insecure because one could find the short private exponent d in polynomial time by using the continued fractions algorithm. In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [2] showed how to improve the bound of Wiener up to d < N 0.292 . Their attack is based on the famous L 3 -lattice reduction algorithm [10] by Coppersmith [4] on finding small roots of particular bivariate modular polynomial equations.
At Asiacrypt'99, Sun, Yang, and Laih [17] [18] designed three variants of RSA using prime factors p and q of unbalanced size. The first RSA variant is an attempt to make the private exponent d short below Wiener's bound [21] and Boneh and Durfee's bound [2] . In this variant, the RSA system is constructed from p and q of different sizes in order to defend against the well-known short private exponent attacks. They claimed that when p and q are unbalanced enough, d can be even smaller than N 0.25 . A suggested choice of parameters is: p of 256 bits, q of 768 bits, and d of 192 bits. Note that in this variant, e is determined as that in typical RSA, hence e is of 1024 bits. The second RSA variant is constructed in such a way that both d and e have the same bit-length 1 2 log 2 N + 56 by choosing unbalanced p of 1 2 log 2 N − 112 bits and q of 1 2 log 2 N + 112 bits respectively. The motivation of this variant is for balancing and minimizing both public and private exponents. A suggested choice of parameters is: p of 400 bits, q of 624 bits, d of 568 bits, and e of 568 bits. The third RSA variant is constructed by such a method that allows a trade-off between the lengths of d and e (that is log 2 e + log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + l k , where l k is a predetermined constant, e.g., 112) under the limitation of log 2 p + log 2 d ≤ log 2 N (assuming p < q). The purpose of this variant is for rebalancing the computation cost between encryption and decryption. By this method, one may shift the work from decryptor to encryptor. An illustrated instance of RSA has the parameters: p of 256 bits, q of 768 bits, d of 256 bits, and e of 880 bits. Unfortunately, Durfee and Nguyen [5] broke the illustrated instances of the first RSA variant and the third RSA variant by solving small roots to trivariate modular polynomial equations. They also showed that the instances generated by these three RSA variants with unbalanced p and q in fact become more insecure than those instances, having the same sizes of exponents as the former, in RSA with balanced p and q. In this paper, we are interested in enhancing the security of Sun et al.'s RSA variants by using bal-anced p and q. It is clear that for the first RSA variant, the improved one with balanced p and q is in fact the standard RSA. Hence, it is impossible to make d short below Boneh and Durfee's bound and Wiener's bound. Therefore, we will not focus on the first variant. For the second RSA variant, it is unable to make p and q balanced because p is of 1 2 log 2 N − 112 bits and q is of 1 2 log 2 N + 112 bits in this variant. For the third RSA variant, the possible constructed RSA with balanced p and q are only those instances of RSA with d of 1 2 log 2 N bits and e of 1 2 log 2 N + l k bits. This is due to the limitation of log 2 p + log 2 d ≤ log 2 N . In this paper, we focus on designing a new RSA variant with balanced p and q, and balanced d and e in order to make such an RSA variant more secure against the Durfee-Nguyen attack and the other existing attacks. Moreover, we also extend our variant to another RSA variant in which p and q are balanced and log 2 e + log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + l k . Compared with RSA using CRT-based decryption (RSA-CRT for short), our schemes seem not to provide better performance for decryption. However it is still an interesting topic like those short exponent attacks [2] [21] working on the standard RSA. Moreover, based on our schemes, we present an application to entity authentication for defending the stolen-secret attack. On the contrary, RSA-CRT can not be applied to the application. We refer the readers to Section 7.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the standard RSA, RSA-CRT, Sun et al.'s RSA variants, and recall some well-known attacks on RSA with short private exponent. In Section 3, we present a new RSA variant with balanced p and q, and balanced e and d; and show the flexibility for constructing such an RSA variant. In Section 4, we analyze the security of this proposed RSA variant. In Section 5, we extend the proposed RSA variant in Section 3 to another RSA variant in which p and q are balanced and log 2 e + log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + l k . In Section 6, we show the experimental results of our implementations for our schemes. In Section 7, we compare our RSA variants with RSA-CRT, and give an application based on our RSA variants. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 8.
Preliminaries

Description of Notations
The notations in Table 1 are used throughout this paper.
The Standard RSA and RSA-CRT
In standard RSA, N = p × q is the product of two large primes p and q. The public exponent e and private exponent d satisfy e × d ≡ 1 mod φ(N ), where φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler totient function of N . Here, N is called the RSA modulus. The public key is the pair (N, e) that is used for encryption (or signature verification): c = m e mod N . The private key d is to enable decryption of ciphertext (or signature generation): m = c d mod N . Traditionally, we select Table 1 . Notations
The two large primes of RSA. N :
The product of two large prime factors p and q, i.e. N = p × q. e, d :
The public exponent and private exponent, ed ≡ 1 mod φ(N ). ∆ :
The prime difference,
The bit-length of a variable X.
two primes (of 512 bits) p and q first, and then multiply them to obtain N (about 1024 bits). Next, we pick the public exponent e first, and then determine the private exponent d by d ≡ e −1 mod φ(N ), or we select the private exponent d first, and then compute the public exponent e by e ≡ d 
Sun, Yang, and Laih's RSA Variants
At Asiacrypt'99, Sun et al. [17] [18] designed three variants of RSA using prime factors p and q of unbalanced size. The first variant of RSA is an attempt to make the private exponent d short below Wiener's bound and Durfee and Nguyen's bound. In this variant, the RSA system is designed by unbalanced p and q in order to defend against all existing attacks on short private exponent. The second variant of RSA is an attempt to balance and minimize both public and private exponents. It is constructed in such a way that both d and e have the same size of 1 2 log 2 N + 56 bits by choosing unbalanced p of 1 2 log 2 N − 112 bits and q of 1 2 log 2 N + 112 bits respectively. The third variant of RSA is an attempt to rebalance the computation cost between encryption and decryption. By this variant, one may shift the work from decryptor to encryptor. It is constructed by such a method that allows a trade-off between the lengths of d and e (that is log 2 e + log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + 112) under the limitation of log 2 p + log 2 d ≤ log 2 N . Due to the limit of space, we describe the details of these three RSA variants in Appendix A.
Very soon, Durfee and Nguyen [5] broke the illustrated instances of the first RSA variant and the third RSA variant. Moreover, they showed that the instances generated by these three RSA variants with unbalanced p and q in fact become more insecure than those instances, having the same sizes of exponents as the former, in RSA with balanced p and q. We describe their attack later.
Attacks on RSA with Short Private Exponent
Wiener's Attack and its Extensions Wiener's attack [21] is based on continued fractions algorithm to find the numerator and denominator of a fraction in polynomial time when a sufficiently close estimate of the fraction is known. He showed that the RSA system can be totally broken if the private exponent is up to approximately one-quarter as many bits as the modulus under both p and q of approximately the same size. For simplicity, we slightly modify Wiener's attack in the following way. Since ed ≡ 1 mod φ(N ), there exists a k, As pointed out by Pinch [12] , if p < q < 2p and d < The Boneh-Durfee Attack and its Extension Based on solving the small inverse problem, Boneh and Durfee [2] proposed another attack on RSA with short private exponent, which leads to a better bound than that proposed by Wiener [21] . They concluded that if e ≈ N and d < N 0.292 , then the private exponent d can be found efficiently.
In typical RSA system, ed = kφ(N ) + 1, e = N and
, and t = −k. Then ed + t(A + s) = 1. Thus, t(A + s) ≡ 1(mod e) and we can bound s and t by |t| < 3e Boneh and Durfee solved the small inverse problem by using Coppersmith's approach [4] . Recall that let h(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] be a polynomial which is a sum of at most w monomials. Suppose that (1) h(x 0 , y 0 ) ≡ 0 mod e m for some positive integer m where |x 0 | < X and |y 0 | < Y , and (2) ||h(xX, yY )|| < e m / √ w, then h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 holds over the integers.
The small inverse problem is the following: given a polynomial f (x, y) = x(A + y) − 1, find an (x 0 , y 0 ) as f (x 0 , y 0 ) ≡ 0(mod e) where |x 0 | < e δ and |y 0 | < e 0.5 . We would find a polynomial with a small norm that has (x 0 , y 0 ) as a root modulo e m for some positive integer m. Boneh and Durfee defined the polynomials
For each k, they used g i,k (xX, yY ) for i = 0, ..., m − k and used h j,k (xX, yY ) for j = 0, ..., t, where t is minimized based on m. Observe that the matrix is triangular and has a dimension (m+1)(m+2) 2 + t(m + 1). The determinant of the lattice can be easily computed as the product of the diagonal entries
Let det(L) = det x · det y . By Ignoring the denominator in order to simplify the derivations, we get the condition det(L) < e mw . Finally, on the basis of the lattice theory and Coppersmith's approach, We deduce that
For large m, this converges to δ < 7 6 − √ 7 3 ≈ 0.285. By working on a sublattice, the bound on δ can be improved to δ < 1 − √ 2 2 ≈ 0.292. Another improvement was proposed by Wager [20] . He showed that RSA is insecure when the length δ of the private exponent is in 2−4γ < δ < 1− 2γ − The Cubic Attack Here, we review the cubic attack in [17] [18]. In RSA, N = pq and ed = k(p − 1)(q − 1) + 1, therefore, the modular equations are k(p − 1)(q − 1) + 1 ≡ 0(mod e) and pq ≡ N (mod e). According to the above two equations, we can obtain one cubic equation with two variables k and p :
log 2 e, we can solve such a cubic equation heuristically using Coppersmith's technique [4] . 
They treated the above equation as a trivariate equation modular e with three unknown variables, k, p, q, with the special property that the product pq of two of them is the known quantity N . Here, the problem is regarded as given a polynomial 
,and b = 0, 1; and, h k,j (x, y, z) := e m−k y a+j f k (x, y, z), for k = 0..m and j = 0..t, then fixed an integer m, and let a and t > 0 be integers which would be optimized later. Following the LLL algorithm [4] , they obtained two short vectors corresponding to polynomials h 1 (x, y, z), h 2 (x, y, z) that had (k, p, q) as a root over the integers; and letting z = y N , they deduced these polynomials to bivariate polynomials H 1 (x, y) and H 2 (x, y) which had (k, p) as a solution. Taking the resultant Res x (H 1 (x, y), H 2 (x, y)) produced an univariate polynomial H(y) which had p as a root. They summarized the largest possible δ for which their attack could succeed as shown in Table 2 .
From Table 2 , we conclude that instances from RSA with unbalanced p and q are in fact more insecure than those from RSA with unbalanced p and q.An improvement of Durfee-Nguyen's largest δ was proposed by Hong et al. in [7] . They showed how to improve the bound from 0.483 to 0.486 when log N (p) ≈ 0.4, log N (e) ≈ 0.55 using Coppersmith's theorem [4] . Because their attack is very similar to the Durfee-Nguyen attack, we omit to review the details of their attack. 
The Proposed Scheme
Our scheme is based on the Extended Euclidean algorithm [6] .
. Our method is as follows:
Scheme A: input: l N and w; output: e, d, p, q and N .
Step 1. Randomly select a prime p of 1 2 l N bits.
Step 2. Randomly select a number k , such that k (p − 1) is of 1 2 l N + w bits, where w is a security parameter, e.g., w = 56.
Step 3. Randomly select a number d of Step 6. Try to find v = k q , where l k = w and q + 1 is a prime. If this fails, go to Step 3. Step 7. Let e = u , q = q + 1, and N = pq.
The algorithm will generate RSA instances in which both p and q are approximately 1 2 log 2 N bits long, and both e and d are approximately ( 1 2 log 2 N +w) bits long. Also the resulting e and d will satisfy ed = k k (p−1)(q−1)+1 = kφ(N )+1, where k = k k . Note that the prime p generated in Step 1 can be determined arbitrarily, e.g., by selecting a strong prime p, but the prime q generated in Step 7 cannot. Fortunately, for an RSA key the requirement that p and q are strong primes is no longer needed due to [15] . As an example, we construct an instance of RSA that p is of 512 bits, q is of 513 bits, and e and d are 568 bits (assigning log 2 N ≈ 1024, and w = 56). We show this instance in Appendix B.
Feasibility for the Algorithm
In this section, we show that the proposed algorithm in Section 3.1 is feasible. Without loss of generality, we assume log 2 N ≈ 1024, and w = 56. The critical step in the above algorithm is Step 6. Because v is about of 568 or 569 bits, we will try to find a lower bound for the probability of that being given a random number x of 568 or 569 bits, it can be expressed in the form x = yz satisfying l x = 568 or 569, l y = 56, l z = 512 or 513 or 514, and z + 1 being a prime. Theorem 1. The probability that given a randomly selected number x of 568 or 569 bits, it can be expressed in the form x = yz satisfying l x = 568 or 569, l y = 56, l z = 512 or 513 or 514, and z + 1 being a prime is much higher than 1 387618 . Proof. We omit the details due to the limit of space.
Based on Theorem 1, the existence and its probability for a random number which can go through Step 6 in the proposed scheme has been evaluated. Now we consider the cost for factoring a 568-bit v into the form: k q , where l k = 56, in Step 6. Given a number v , it is easy for us to find all prime factors of v which are less than 56 bits by some well-known factoring algorithms, such as ECM algorithm [8] . Then we can try to combine these prime factors to form a 56-bit k in polynomial time.
Security Considerations
In this section, we analyze our scheme to thwart the previous well-known attacks on short private exponent, including Wiener's attack [21] , the Boneh-Durfee attack [2] , the Durfee-Nguyen attack [5] , the cubic attack [17] [18] , and their extensions [7] [19] [20] .
Defending against Wiener's Attack We will check the security of our RSA variant according to Wiener's attack. It is clear that
In our variant, p and q are about of 512 bits, and e and d are about of 568 bits, so 2 Defending against the Boneh-Durfee Attack and the Durfee-Nguyen Attack Following Boneh and Durfee's approach, let A = N + 1, s = −(p + q), and t = −k. Thus t(A + s) ≡ 1( mod e). Let |s| < e α and |t| < e β . The sufficient condition for solving the small inverse problem is: 4α(2β +α−1) < 3(1−β −α)
2 .
In Next, we examine the largest δ (where d < N δ ) for which the Durfee-Nguyen attack [5] can succeed. Our p is of 512 bits, then log N (p) ≈ 0.5; e is of 568 bits, then log N (e) ≈ 0.55; and d is of 568 bits. So, we can figure out d ≈ N Finally, we check the prime difference that Weger proposed.
29289. In our RSA variant, the private exponent is of 568 bits. Therefore, δ = 568 1024 = 0.5546875 which is out of the range of 0 < δ < 0.29289. So our RSA variant is secure against Weger's attack [20] .
Defending against the Cubic Attack According to Section 2.3.3 for the cubic attack, in our variant, k is of 112 bits, p is of 512 bits, and e is of 568 bits. It is clear that log 2 k + log 2 p ≈ 112 + 512 = 624 >> Defending against an Exhaustive Search One can check a guess for k since φ(N ) = N + 1 − (p + q) ≡ (−k) −1 (mod e) and so (p + q) ≡ N + 1 + k −1 (mod e). Since p + q < e, this gives p + q exactly and then we can test the guess by checking whether a N +1−(p+q) ≡ 1(mod N ) for a random value a. In our proposed scheme, k is large enough (112 bits), an exhaustive search method can not work effectively.
Defending against Other Attacks
We also consider the extensions of the above attacks, including the Verheul and Tilborg attack [19] , the Weger attack [20] , and Hong et al.' attack [7] . There is no evidence showing that the proposed scheme is insecure under these extensions. We also try to construct new polynomial equations in which we expect to solve their roots using Coppersmith Sun et al.'s third RSA variant is designed for rebalancing the computation cost between encryption and decryption. By this method, one may shift the work from decryptor to encryptor due to log 2 e + log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + l k , where l k is a predetermined constant, e.g., l k =112. However, the constructed RSA has the limitation of log 2 p + log 2 d ≤ log 2 N (assuming p < q). That means that if we make both p and q have the same length, [16] proposed a key generation algorithm for RSA which provides the similar goal as Sun et al.'s third variant. Regrettably, their algorithm is insecure due to [17] [18] . In this section, we present a new RSA variant with balanced p and q and log 2 e + log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + l k without any other constraint. Without loss of generality, we assume d < e. If d > e, we need only interchange them.
Scheme B: input: l N , l d , and l k ; output: e, d, p, q and N .
Step 1. Randomly select a prime p of
Step 2. Randomly select a number k such that
bits, where l k is a security parameter, e.g., l k = 112, and l d is the bit-length of d. Here we omit to analyze the feasibility for this algorithm and the security for this variant because these analyses are very similar to those of Scheme A. Instead, we illustrate two instances constructed from this variant. The first instance has p and q of 512 bits, d of 540 bits, and e of 596 bits; and the other one has p and q of 512 bits primes, d of 512 bits, and e of 624 bits. These two examples are shown in Appendix C.
Implementations for the Proposed Schemes
In order to show that our schemes are actually feasible, we implemented our algorithms and measured the average running time for three different sizes of Table 3 . Experimental results in PC platform of 2.8GHz CPU, 512M DRAM. RSA. The main component in our implementations is the factorization method.
In our implementations, we select Pollard p − 1 method [13] as our fundamental factorization method. Furthermore, the programming language used for our implementations is C under NTL with GMP (GNU Multi-Precision library) on Windows systems using Cygwin tools. The machine we used is a personal computer (PC) with 2.8GHz CPU and 512MB DRAM. We consider three different cases for comparisons. The first case has p and q of 512 bits, d and e of 568 bits; the second case has p and q of 512 bits, d of 540 bits, and e of 596 bits; the third case has p and q of 512 bits, d of 512 bits, and e of 624 bits. Table 3 shows the results and conditions for generating RSA key pairs in our schemes. The item "B Bound", a predetermined integer using the Pollard p − 1 method, denotes the upper bound for all prime power divisors of p − 1. This value is chosen by experience in our program. The item "AverageTime" denotes the average running time for each case upon testing 100 samples. The item "AverageLoopNum" counts the number of loops running from Step 3 to Step 6 . Note that what we are doing in Step 6 of our implementations is only to find small factors of v and then try to compose part of these small factors into what we need. According to our experiments, if one tries to factor v completely, then "AverageLoopNum" will be smaller, but "AverageTime" will be longer because the time will be dominated by the factorization. From Table 3 , we know that the more balanced e and d are, the more time-consuming our algorithms are. The most time-consuming case is exactly Scheme A. The average time for generating such a key pair is about 16 minutes under our implementations. This may be heavy for the end user's use. However, it can be much improved by some parallel techniques and/or high-end computers in the case when the RSA key pair must be generated and issued by centralized control. For example, a trusted CA issues smart cards in which every users private key, public key, and the corresponding certificate are embedded by a smart card writer.
Discussion and Application
Comparing with the typical RSA with small e and randomly determined d, Scheme A is about twice faster in decryption, but the public exponent e is about of 1 2 l N bits. On the other hand, RSA-CRT achieves 4 times faster and can choose small e, e.g. e=2
16 +1. Thus, our variants can not provide better performance than RSA-CRT. However RSA-CRT needs to keep more secrets (d p , d q , p, and q) than our schemes. Besides, RSA-CRT usually brings on some additional security problems [9] . In the following, we further propose an application, based on RSA, to entity authentication for defending a type of attack, called the stolen-secret attack. It is remarked that our RSA variants can be applied to realize such an application, while RSA-CRT can not.
With two-party authentication protocols in place, it would be easy for one participant to establish trusted communication with the other. In general, there are three approaches to designing authentication protocols. The first approach is based on the public-key cryptosystem (involving signature mechanism). This approach works under PKI environment and needs a trusted CA to support. The second approach is based on a shared password which is easy to remember by user. This approach usually need to be designed to defend the dictionary attack. The third approach is based on a shared secret-key of a symmetric cryptosystem. This approach uses symmetric-key encryption to validate the identity of protocol participants. Here we consider the stolen-secret attack in which an adversary who has stolen the secret (a private key, or a shared password, or a shared secret-key) from one party can use it directly to masquerade as the other party. Among these three approaches, the first approach is secure against the stolen-secret attack because one party's private key leaked will not lead to a forgery of the other party. However, it is only suitable for the environment with CA and PKI supporting. For the password-based protocol, because two parties share a common password, therefore it is insecure against the stolen-secret attack. An improvement for this approach is called the verifier-based protocol in which one party (client) keeps a password and the other one (server) keeps the corresponding verifier (usually it is a hashed image of the password). Thus if the verifier is leaked, it will not lead a forgery of the client. However, if the password is leaked (on the client side), this will lead to a successful forgery of the server because the verifier can be easily computed from password. As for the third approach, it is clear that the stolen-secret attack can work well.
As mentioned above, the stolen-secret attack is a baffling problem in authentication protocols. Here we attempt to enhance the secret-key based protocol to defend the stolen-secret attack. In general, RSA system generates a key pair (e,d), where the public key e is disclosed and the private key d is disguised. If both e and d are kept secret by two parties respectively, and p and q are unknown to any one. Thus we can regard RSA as a secret-key cryptosystem. We imagine that a key distribution center generates an RSA key pair (e,d) by using the key generating algorithm in Scheme A. And then e is kept secret by Alice and d is kept secret by Bob. The RSA modulus N is public but no one knows p and q exactly. Thus, neither Alice nor Bob can obtain the secret of each other. Note that it is clear that RSA-CRT can not be used in such a situation because p and q are unknown by any party.
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway [1] proposed two provably secure symmetric-key authentication protocols, MAP1 and MAP2. MAP1 is a mutual authentication protocol for two parties, and MAP2 allows arbitrary text strings to be authenticated along with its flows. As our examples of defending the stolen-secret attack, we modify MAP1 and MAP2 in the following. A brief outline of these two protocols and our improvements are presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . Here A a and B a denote that Alice keeps a shared secret key a with Bob; and A e and B d denote that Alice keeps e and Bob keeps d, where (e,d) is a key pair of RSA using our scheme A. Let R X denote a random challenge from X and [x] k = (x, f k (x)),where f k (x) is a pseudorandom function family specified by key k. It is commonly believed that pseudorandom functions can be well-implemented by encryption primitives in practice. Here we replace f k (x) by either a symmetric-key encryption with key k (in MAP1 and MAP2) or an encryption of RSA with exponent k (in the improved MAP1 and the improved MAP2). Here we remark that the plain RSA encryption can not be used directly for practical purpose, some padding techniques, such as PKCS #1 and OAEP, are required. We also note that although we limit our discussion to authentication protocols, there exists the even more important concept of key-distribution, often coupled with authentication. Our improvements to defend the stolen-secret attack can be also applied to those key distribution protocols whose security are based on symmetric-key encryption. Step 1. Randomly select a prime number p of length l p , such that it is large enough to make an ECM [11] attack infeasible.
Step 2. Randomly select a number k of length l k .
Step 3. Randomly select a number d of length l d and gcd(k(p − 1), d) = 1.
Step 4. we can uniquely determine two numbers u and v such that du − k(p − 1)v = 1, where 0 < u < k(p − 1) and 0 < v < d.
Step 5. If gcd(v + 1, d) = 1, then go to Step 3.
Step 6. Randomly select a number h of length l N − l p − l d , then compute u = u + hk(p − 1) and v = v + hd.
Step 7. If v + 1 is not a prime number, go to Step 6.
Step 8. Let p, q = v + 1, e = u, d, and N = pq are the parameters of RSA.
For the third RSA variant, the possibly constructed RSA with balanced p and q are only those instances of RSA with d of 1 2 log 2 N bits and e of 1 2 log 2 N + l k bits, e.g., l k =112. This is due to the limitation of log 2 p + log 2 d ≤ log 2 N . 
